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Abstract
Monoidal computer is a categorical model of intensional computa-
tion, where many different programs correspond to the same input-output
behavior. The upshot of yet another model of computation is that a
categorical formalism should provide a high-level language for theory of
computation, flexible enough to allow abstracting away the low level im-
plementation details when they are irrelevant, or taking them into ac-
count when they are genuinely needed. A salient feature of the approach
through monoidal categories is the formal graphical language of string di-
agrams, which supports geometric reasoning about programs and compu-
tations. In the present paper, we provide a coalgebraic characterization of
monoidal computer. It turns out that the availability of interpreters and
specializers, that make a monoidal category into a monoidal computer,
is equivalent with the existence of a universal state space, that carries
a weakly final state machine for all types of input and output. Being
able to program state machines in monoidal computers allows us to rep-
resent Turing machines, and capture the time and space needed for their
executions. The coalgebraic view of monoidal computer thus provides a
convenient diagrammatic language for studying not only computability,
but also complexity.
1 Introduction
In theory of computation, an extensional model reduces computations to their
set theoretic extensions, computable functions, whereas an intensional model
also takes into account the multiple programs that describe each computable
function [4, 32, II.3].
∗Partially supported by AFOSR and NSF.
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In computer science, this semantical gamut got refined on the extensional
side by denotational models, that take into account not just computable func-
tions but also some computational effects, and on the intensional side by opera-
tional models, where the meaning of a program is specified up to an operational
equivalence [9, 53]. Categorical semantics of computation arose from the real-
ization that cartesian closed categories provide a simple and effective framework
for studying the extensional models [26]. Both denotational and operational se-
mantics naturally developed as extensions of this categorical framework [29, 50].
The goal of the monoidal computer project is to provide categorical se-
mantics of intensional computation. This turns out to be surprisingly simple
technically, but subtle conceptually. In this section, we describe the structure of
monoidal computer informally, and try to explain it in the context of categorical
semantics. In the rest of the paper, we spell out some of its features formally,
in particular the coalgebraic part.
1.1 Categorical computability: context and concept
The step from a cartesian closed category C, as an extensional model of compu-
tation, to a monoidal computer C, as an intensional model, can be summarized
as follows:
C (X, [A,B]) C(X ×A,B)
εAB
X
∼=
λAB
X
C•(X,P) C(X ⊗A,B)
γAB
X
(1)
The first line says that a category C is cartesian closed when it has the (cartesian)
products X × A and a family of bijections, natural in X and indexed over the
types A and B, between the morphisms X × A −→ B and X −→ [A,B]. If a
morphism X × A
f
−→ B is thought of as an X-indexed family of computations
with the inputs from A and the outputs in B, then the corresponding morphism
X
λAB
X
(f)
−−−−−→ [A,B] can be thought of as the X-indexed family of programs for
these computations. This structure is the categorical version of the simply typed
extensional lambda calculus: λABX corresponds to the operation of abstraction,
whereas εABX corresponds to the application [26, Part I]. The equation ε
AB
X ◦
λABX = id says that if we abstract a computation into a program, and then apply
that program to some data, then we will get the same result as if we executed
the original computation on the data. This is the β-rule of the lambda calculus,
the crux of Alonzo Church’s representation of program evaluations as function
applications of λ-abstractions [10]. The equation λABX ◦ε
AB
X = id says that if we
apply a program, and then abstract out of the resulting computation a program,
then we will get the same program that we started from. This is the η-rule of
the lambda calculus: the extensionality. Dropping the second equation thus
corresponds to modeling the non-extensional typed lambda calculus, with weak
exponent types. While this structure was sometimes interpreted as a model of
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intensional computation, and interesting results were obtained [18], the main
result was that every such non-extensional model is essentially extensional, in
the sense that it contains an extensional model as a computable retract [15]. In
genuinely intensional models, identifying extensionally equivalent programs is
not computable.
The structure of a monoidal computer C is displayed in the second line of
(1). There are three changes with respect to the cartesian closed structure:
a) the bijections εABX are relaxed to surjections γ
AB
X ;
b) the exponents [A,B] are replaced with the type P of programs, the same for
all types A and B; and
c) the product × is replaced by a tensor ⊗, and C is not a cartesian category,
but C• on the left is its largest cartesian subcategory with ⊗ as the product.
Change (a) means that we have not only dropped the extensionality equa-
tion λABX ◦ ε
AB
X = id, but eliminated the abstraction operation λ
AB
X altogether.
All that is left of the bijection between the abstractions and the applications,
displayed in the first line of (1), is a surjection from programs to computations,
displayed in the second line of (1): for every X-indexed family of computa-
tions X ⊗A
f
−→ B there is an X-indexed family of programs X
F
−→ P such that
f = γABX (F ). Could we get away with less? No, because the program evaluation
γABX has a left inverse λ
AB
X if and only if the model is essentially extensional
(i.e., it contains an extensional retract). We will see in Sec. 3.1 that the program
evaluation γABX is in fact executed by a universal evaluator {}
AB ∈ C(P⊗A,B),
and thus takes the form γABX (F ) = {F}
AB
= f .
Change (b) means that all programs are of the same type P. The central
feature of intensional computation is that any program can be applied to any
data, and in particular to itself. The main constructions of computability theory
depend on this, as we shall see in Sec. 3.4. If computations of type A −→ B were
encoded by programs of a type depending on A and B, let us write it in the form
⌈A,B⌉, then such programs could not be applied to themselves, but they could
only be processed by programs typed in the form ⌈⌈A,B⌉, C⌉. That is why all
programs must be of the same type P. We will see in Sec. 3.3 that this implies
that all types must be retracts of P. This does not imply that the type structure
of a monoidal computer can be completely derived from an applicative structure
on P, as an essentially untyped model of computation [26, I.15-I.17]. The type
structure of monoidal computer, can be derived from internal structure of P if
and only if the model is essentially extensional (i.e., it contains an extensional
retract, like before). But where does the monoidal structure come from?
Change (c) makes monoidal computers into monoidal categories, not carte-
sian. Just like cartesian categories, monoidal computers have the diagonals and
the projections for all types, which are necessary for data copying and deleting,
as explained in Sec. 2. Unlike in cartesian categories, though, the diagonals
and the projections in monoidal computers are not natural. The projections are
not natural because intensional computations may not terminate: they are not
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total morphisms. The diagonals are not natural when the computations are not
deterministic: they are then not single-valued as morphisms. While intensional
computations can be deterministic, and the diagonals in a monoidal computer
can all be natural, if all projections are natural, i.e. if all computations are
total, then the model contains an extensional retract. A monoidal computer is
thus a cartesian category if and only if it is essentially extensional. That is why
a genuinely intensional monoidal computer must be genuinely monoidal. On
the other hand, even a computation that is nowhere defined has a program, and
programs are always well-defined values. So while the indexed families of in-
tensional computations cannot all be total functions, the corresponding indexed
families of programs must all be total functions. That is why the category C•
on the left in (1) is different from C: it is the largest subcategory of C for which
⊗ is the cartesian product.
In summary, dropping or weakening any of changes described in (a-c) leads
to the same outcome: an essentially extensional model. For a genuinely inten-
sional model it is thus necessary to have (c) a genuinely monoidal structure, (b)
untyped programs, and (a) no computable program abstraction operators. It
was shown in [39, 44] that this is also sufficient for a categorical reconstruction
of the basic concepts of computability. Sections 2 and 3 provide a brief overview
of this. But our main concern in this paper is complexity.
1.2 Categorical complexity: Coalgebraic view
To capture complexity, we must capture dynamics, i.e. access the actual process
of computation. This, of course, varies from model to model, and different mod-
els of computation induce different notions of complexity. Abstract complexity
[7] provides, in a sense, a model-independent common denominator, which can
be viewed as an abstract notion of complexity; but the categorical view of com-
putations as morphisms at the first sight does not even provide a foothold for
abstract complexity. We attempted to mitigate the problem by extending the
structure of monoidal computer by grading [41], but the approach turned out
to be impractical for our goals (indicated in the next section). Now it turns out
to also be unnecessary, since dynamics of computation can be captured using
the coalgebraic tools available in any monoidal computer.
Coalgebra is the categorical toolkit for studying dynamics in general [45,
48], and dynamics of computation in particular [25, 43, 50]. Coalgebras, as
morphisms in the form X −→ EX for an endofuctor E, provide a categorical
view of automata, state machines, and processes with state update [20, 42];
the other way around, all coalgebras can be thought of as processes with state
update. In the framework on this paper, only a very special class of coalgebras
will be considered, as the morphisms in the form X×A −→ X×B, corresponding
to what is usually called Mealy machines [8, 14, 17, . . . ]. In the presence of the
exponents, such morphisms can be transposed to proper coalgebras in the form
X −→ [A,X ×B]. But coalgebra provides a categorical reconstruction of state
machines even without the exponents, since the homomorphisms remain the
same, and the category of machines is isomorphic to a category of coalgebras
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even if the objects are not presented as coalgebras in the strict sense. Our
”coalgebras” will thus be in the form X × A −→ X × B, or more generally
X ⊗ A −→ X ⊗B.
The crucial step in moving the monoidal computer story into the realm
of coalgebra is to replace the X-indexed functions X × A
f
−→ B with X-state
machines X × A
m
−→ X × B. While a function f mapped for each index x an
input a to an output b, a machine m now maps at each state x an input a to an
output b, and updates the state to x′. This state update provides an abstract
view of dynamics. Continuous dynamics can be captured in varying the same
approach [42, 45]. This step from X-indexed functions to X-state machines
is displayed in the first row of Table 1. The representation of functions from
models static dynamic
extensional
models:
cartesian
closed
[A,B]×A B
X ×A
ε
∀f∃!λf×A
abstractions
ε
←→
λ
applications
[A+, B]×B
[A+, B]×A X ×B
X ×A
ξ JmK×B
∀m∃! JmK×A
behaviors
J−K
←−− machines
intensional
models:
monoidal
computers
P⊗ A B
X ⊗A
{}
∀f∃F×A
programs −→−→ computations
P⊗ B
P⊗A X ⊗B
X ⊗A
{| |} ∃M⊗B
∀m∃M⊗A
adaptive programs ⇀⇀ processes
Table 1: Semantic directions
A to B by the elements of [A,B] lifts to the representation of machines with
inputs in A and outputs in B by the induced behaviors in [A+, B], where A+
is the inductive type of the nonempty sequences from A. Behaviors are thus
construed as functions extended in time [20, 44, 48]. In the presence of list
constructors, the representation of functions using the exponents [A,B] induces
the representation of machines using the final machines [A+, B]. The other way
around, the final machines induce the exponents as soon as the idempotents
split. This is proved in the Appendix.
The rows of Table 1 depict the step from static models to dynamic models.
The columns depict the step from the extensional to the intensional. The left-
hand column is just a different depiction of (1): the upper triangle unpacks the
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bijection in the first line of (1), whereas the lower triangle unpacks the surjec-
tion in the second line. The right-hand column is the step from the extensional
coinduction of final state machines to the intensional coinduction in monoidal
computer. The bottom row of Table 1 is the step from the monoidal computer
structure presented in terms of universal evaluators, the content of Sec. 3, to
the monoidal computer structure presented in terms of universal processes, the
content of Sec. 4. The fact that the two presentations are equivalent is stated
in Thm. 4.3. This coalgebraic view of intensional computation opens an alley
towards capturing dynamics of Turing machines in Sec. 5, and a direct internal-
ization of time and space complexity measures in Sec. 6. A comment about the
role of coalgebra in this effort is in Sec. 7. A general approach through abstract
complexity is provided in the full version of the paper.
1.3 Background and related work
While computability and complexity theorists seldom felt a need to learn about
categories, there is a rich tradition of categorical research in computability the-
ory, starting from one of the founders of category theory and his students [13, 34],
through extensive categorical investigations of realizability [16, 19, 33], to the
recent work on Turing categories [12], and on a monoidal structure of Turing
machines [5]. A categorical account of time complexity was proposed in [11], us-
ing a special structure called timed sets, introduced for the purpose. While our
approach in [41] used grading in a similar way, our current approach seems closer
in spirit to [3], even if that work is neither coalgebraic nor explicitly categorical.
Our effort originated from a need for a framework for reasoning about logical
depth of cryptographic protocols and algorithms [37]. The scope of the project
vastly exceeded the original cost estimates [40], but also the original benefit
expectations. The unexpectedly simple diagrammatic formalism of monoidal
computer has even been used as a slick teaching tool in several courses.1
2 Preliminaries
A monoidal computer is a symmetric monoidal category with some additional
structure. As a matter of convenience, and with no loss of generality, we assume
that it is a strict monoidal category. The reader familiar with these concepts
may wish to skip to the next section. For the casual reader unfamiliar with these
concepts, we attempt to provide enough intuitions to understand the presented
ideas. The reader interested to learn more about monoidal categories should
consult one of many textbooks, e.g. [27, VII.1,XI].
1The course materials are available from http://www.asecolab.org/courses/222/, and
the textbook [44] is in preparation.
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2.1 Monoidal categories
Intuitively, a monoidal category is a category C together with a functorial
monoid structure C × C
⊗
−→ C
I
←− 1. When C is a monoidal computer, then
we think of its objects A,B, . . . ∈ |C| as datatypes, and of its morphisms,
f, g, . . . ∈ C(A,B) as computations. The tensor product A ⊗ P
f⊗t
−−→ B ⊗ Q
then captures the parallel composition of the computations A
f
−→ B and P
t
−→ Q,
whereas the categorical composition A
f ;g
−−→ C is the sequential composition of
A
f
−→ B and B
g
−→ C.
With no loss of generality, we assume that tensors are strictly associative
and unitary, and thus treat the objects A ⊗ (B ⊗ C) and (A ⊗ B) ⊗ C as the
same, and do not distinguish A⊗ I and I ⊗ A from A. This allows us to elide
many parentheses and natural coherences [22, 27, Sec. VII.2]. Note, however,
that the isomorphisms A⊗B
ς
−→ B⊗A cannot be eliminated without causing a
degeneracy.
Notation. When no confusion seems likely, we write
• AB instead of A⊗B
• C(X) instead of C(I,X)
We omit the typing superscripts whenever the types are clear from the context.
String diagrams. A salient feature of monoidal categories is that the algebraic
laws of the monoidal structure correspond precisely and conveniently to the
geometric laws of string diagrams, formalized in [22], but going back to [46].
See also [49] for a survey. A string diagram usually consists of polygons or ovals
linked by strings. In a monoidal computer, the polygons represent computations,
whereas the strings represent data types, or the channels through which the
data of the corresponding types flow. String diagrams thus display the data
flows through composite computations. The reason why string diagrams are
convenient for this is that the two program operations that usually generate
data flows, the sequential composition f ; g and the parallel composition f ⊗
t, precisely correspond to the two geometric operations that generate string
diagrams: one is the operation of connecting the polygons A
f
−→ B and B
g
−→
C by the string B, whereas the other one puts the polygons A
f
−→ B and
P
t
−→ Q next to each other without connecting them. The associativity of these
geometric operations then imposes the associativity law on the corresponding
operations on computations. The identity morphism idA, as the unit of the
sequential composition, can be viewed as the channel of type A, and can thus
be presented as the string A itself, or as an ”invisible polygon” freely moved
along the string A. The unit type I can be similarly presented as an ”invisible
string”, freely added and removed to string diagrams. The algebraic laws of the
monoidal structure are thus captured by the geometric properties of the string
diagrams. The string crossings correspond to the symmetries A⊗B
ς
−→ B ⊗A.
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2.2 Data services
We call data service the monoidal structure that allows passing the data around
in a monoidal category. In computer programs and in mathematical formulas,
the data are usually passed around using variables. They allow copying and
propagating the data values where they are needed, or deleting them when they
are not needed. The basic features of a variable are thus that it can be freely
copied or deleted. The basic data services over a type A in a monoidal category
C are
• the copying operation A
∆
−→ A⊗A, and
• the deleting operation A
⊤
−→ I,
which together form a commutative comonoid, i.e. satisfy the equations
== =
∆; (∆⊗A) = ∆ ; (A⊗∆) ∆ ; (⊤⊗ A) = ∆ ; (A⊗⊤) = idA
=
∆; σ = ∆
The correspondence between variables and comonoids was formalized and ex-
plained in [35]. The algebraic properties of the binary copying induce unique
n-ary copying A
∆
−→ A⊗n, for all n ≥ 0. The tensor products ⊗ in C are the
cartesian products × if and only if every A in C carries a canonical comonoid
A × A
∆
←− A
⊤
−→ 1, where 1 is the final object of C, and all morphisms of C
are comonoid homomorphisms, or equivalently, the families A
∆
−→ A × A and
A
⊤
−→ 1 are natural. Cartesian categories are thus just monoidal categories with
natural families of copying and deleting operations.
Definition 2.1. A data service of type A in a monoidal category C is a com-
mutative comonoid structure A ⊗ A
∆
←− A
⊤
−→ I, where ∆ provides the copying
service, and ⊤ provides the deleting service.
Examples and non-examples of data services. The cartesian structure of
the category Set of sets and functions provides the standard data services in the
monoidal category Rel of sets and relations and in the monoidal category Pfn of
sets and partial functions. The cartesian products from Set induce not only the
monoidal structure of Rel and Pfn, but cartesian comonoids A × A
∆
←− A
⊤
−→ 1
in Set also induce data services in Rel and Pfn. The fact that both families of
morphisms ∆ and ⊤, indexed over A, are natural with respect to all functions
is what makes Set into a cartesian category. But Rel is not cartesian because
neither ∆ nor ⊤ are natural with respect to relations; and Pfn is not natural
because ⊤ is not natural with respect to partial functions (although ∆ is). In
addition, Rel also admits many nonstandard data services, that do not come
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from the cartesian structure. This was analyzed in [36, 38]. Any abelian group
(or groupoid) structure A × A
+
−→ A can be used as the comparison operation,
with the corresponding copying operation A
∆
−→ A×A relating each x ∈ A with
all pairs 〈y, z〉 ∈ A×A such that x = y+z. The deletion operationA
⊤
−→ 1 relates
the unit of the group A with the only element of 1. In any case, restricting to
the comonoid homomorphisms makes the chosen data services natural, and the
resulting subcategory cartesian.
Definition 2.2. A morphism f ∈ C(A,B) is a map if it is a comonoid homo-
morphism with respect to the data services on A and B, which means that it
satisfies the following equations
=
f
f f
=
f
f ; ∆B = ∆A ; (f ⊗ f) f ;⊤B = ⊤A
Given a symmetric monoidal category C with data services, we denote by C• the
subcategory spanned by the maps with respect to its data services, i.e. by those
C-morphisms that preserve copying and deleting.
Remark. If C is the category of relations, then the first equation says that f is a
single-valued relation, whereas the second equation says that it is total. Hence
the name. Note that the morphisms ∆ and ⊤ from the data services are maps
with respect to the data service that they induce. They are thus contained in
C•, and each of them forms a natural transformation with respect to the maps.
This just means that the tensor ⊗, restricted to C•, is the cartesian product.
3 Monoidal computer
3.1 Evaluation and evaluators
Definition 3.1. A monoidal computer is
• a (strict) symmetric monoidal category C, with
• a data service A⊗A
∆
←− A
⊤
−→ I on every A,
• a distinguished type of programs P,
• for every pair of types A,B an X-natural family of surjections
C•(X,P) C(XA,B)
γAB
X
called program evaluation.
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The next proposition says that the program evaluations from Def. 3.1 are a
categorical view of Turing’s universal computer [51], or of Kleene’s acceptable
enumerations [47, 32, II.5], or of interpreters and specializers from programming
language theory [21].
Proposition 3.2. Let C be a symmetric monoidal category with data services.
Then specifying the program evaluations γABX : C
•(X,P)։ C(XA,B) that make
C into a monoidal computer, as defined in 3.1, is equivalent to giving for any
three types A,B,C ∈ |C| the following two morphisms:
(a) a universal evaluator {}AB ∈ C(PA,B) such that for every computation
f ∈ C(A,B) there is a program F ∈ C•(P) with
f(a) = {F} a
B
f
A
=
B
{}
F
A
(b) a partial evaluator [ ](AB)C ∈ C•(PA,P) such that
{G} (a, b) = {[G, a]} b
P A
{}
B
C
=
A
{}
[ ]
BP
C
Remark. Note that the partial evaluators [ ] are maps, i.e. total and single valued
morphisms in C•, whereas the universal evaluators {} are ordinary morphisms
in C. A recursion theorist will recognize the universal evaluators as Turing’s
universal machines [51], and the partial evaluators as Go¨del’s primitive recursive
substitution function S, enshrined in Kleene’s Smn -theorem [23]. A programmer
can think of the universal evaluators as interpreters, and of the partial evaluators
as specializers [21]2. In any case, (a) can be understood as saying that every
computation can be programmed; and then (b) says that any program with
several inputs can be evaluated on any of its inputs, and reduced to a program
that waits for the remaining inputs:
2When the theory is refined, it becomes useful to recognize subtle but important conceptual
and technical distinctions.
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=[ ]
{}
A B
C C
BA
{}
G
G
A B
C
=g
g(a, b) {G} (a, b) {[G, a]} b= =
Proof of Prop. 3.2. Every natural transformation γAB : C•(−,P) −→ C(− ⊗
A,B) is uniquely determined by the computation {}AB = γABP (idP) ∈ C(P ⊗
A,B), because the naturality of γAB just means that
γABX (F ) = C(F,P) ◦ γ
AB
P (idP) = (F ⊗A) ; {}
AB = {F}AB
where we write {F} for (F⊗A) ; {} not only for convenience, but also in reverence
to Kleene’s work and vision [24].
C•(P,P) C(P⊗A,B)
idP {}
F {F}
C•(X,P) C(X ⊗A,B)
C•(F,P)
γAB
P
C(F⊗A,B)
γAB
X
Expressed in terms of the properties of the induced computation {}AB ∈ C(P⊗
A,B), the assumption that the program evaluations γABX : C
•(X,P) ։ C(X ⊗
A,B) are surjective functions for all X means that for every computation h ∈
C(X ⊗A,B) there is an X-indexed family of programs H ∈ C•(X,P) such that
{Hx} a = h(x, a) (2)
B
{}
H
AX
=
B
h
AX
B
P⊗A
X ⊗A
{}
h
H⊗A
By the Yoneda lemma [27, III.2], specifying a program evaluation γAB :
C•(−,P)։ C(−⊗A,B) is thus equivalent to specifying a computation {}AB ∈
C(P⊗A,B) satisfying (2). The task of proving the Proposition thus boils down
to showing that (a)⇐⇒ (b)⇒(2).
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Setting X to be the tensor unit I, shows that {}AB ∈ C(P ⊗ A,B) induced as
above by γAB : C•(−,P) −→ C(− ⊗ A,B) satisfies condition (a), and is thus
a universal evaluator. To construct a partial evaluator [ ]ABC ∈ C•(P ⊗ A,P)
satisfying (b), consider the following diagram
C•(P,P) C(P⊗B,C)
C•(P⊗A,P) C(P⊗A⊗B,C)
C•([ ]ABC ,P)
γBC
P
γ
(AB)C
P
C([ ]ABC⊗B,C)
γBC
PA
Since γBCPA is surjective, there must exist [ ]
ABC ∈ C•(P⊗A,P) such that
γBCPA
(
[ ]ABC
)
= γ
(AB)C
P (idP)
Fix a choice of such [ ]ABC ∈ C•(P ⊗ A,P), and chase the above diagram.
Recalling that {}(AB)C = γ
(AB)C
P (idP) and {}
BC = γBCP (idP), and observing
that C•
(
[ ]ABC ,P
)
(idP) = [ ]
ABC ; idP = [ ]
ABC , the naturality of γBC implies
that(
[ ]ABC ⊗B
)
; {}BC = C([ ]ABC ⊗B,C) ; γBCP (idP) =
= γBCPA ◦ C
•([ ]ABC ,P)(idP) = γ
(AB)C
P (idP) = {}
(AB)C
Written in the bracket notation, this boils down to{
[G, a]
ABC }BC
b =
{
G
}(AB)C
(a, b)
which shows that [ ]ABC satisfies (b), as claimed.
Turning to the converse, suppose that universal evaluators {}AB and partial
evaluators [ ]ABC are given, satisfying (a) and (b). We show that the universal
evaluators {}AB then satisfy the stronger requirement (2). Since we showed
above that giving {}AB ∈ C(P⊗ A,B) satisfying (2) is equivalent to specifying
a natural family of surjections γAB : C•(−,P) −→ C(−⊗A,B), this will complete
the proof.
Towards the proof that (a)∧(b)⇒(2), consider an arbitrary computation
h ∈ C(XA,B). Then
• (a) gives H˜ ∈ C(P) such that
{
H˜
}(XA)B
(x, a) = h(x, a), and
• (b) gives Hx =
[
H˜, x
]XAB
∈ C(X,P) such that
{
Hx
}AB
a = h(x, a).
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=[ ]
{}
X A
B B
AX
{}
H˜
H˜
X A
B
=h
h(x, a)
{
H˜
}
(x, a)
{[
H˜, x
]}
y= =
H
Branching. By extending the λ-calculus constructions as in [39], we can ex-
tract from P the convenient types of natural numbers, truth values, etc. E.g.,
if the truth values t and f are defined to be some programs for the two projec-
tions, then the role of the if-branching command can be played by the universal
evaluator:
if(b, x, y) = {b} (x, y) =

x if b = t
y if b = f =
=
t
f
if={}
if={}
3.2 Examples of monoidal computer
Let S be a cartesian category and T : S −→ S a commutative monad. Then the
Kleisli category ST of free algebras is monoidal, with the data services induced
by the cartesian structure of S.
The standard model of monoidal computer C is obtained by taking S to be
the category of finite and countable sets, and TX = ⊥ + X to be the maybe
monad, adjoining a fresh element to every set. The category S⊥ is the category
of partial functions, and the monoidal computer C ⊆ S⊥ is the subcategory of
computable partial functions:
• |C| =
{
A ⊆ N | ∃e ∈ N. {e}a↓ ⇐⇒ a ∈ A
}
• C(A,B) =
{
f : A ⇀ B | ∃e. {e} = f
}
The category C• is then the category of computable total functions. Assuming
that the programs are encoded as natural numbers, the type of programs is
P = N; but any language containing a Turing complete set of expressions would
do, mutatis mutandis. The sequence {0}, {1}, {2}, . . . denotes an acceptable
enumeration of computable partial functions [32, II.5]. The universal evaluators
can be implemented as partial recursive functions; the partial evaluators are the
total recursive functions, constructed in Kleene’s Smn -theorem [23].
Other commutative monads T : S −→ S induce monoidal computers in a
similar way, capturing intensional computations together with the correspond-
ing computational effects: exceptions, nondeterminism, randomness [29]. Some
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of the familiar computational monads need to be restricted to finite support.
The distribution monad must be factored modulo computational indistinguisha-
bility. A simple quantum monoidal computer can be constructed using a relative
monad for finite dimensional vector spaces [1]. However, in the model where
the universal evaluators are quantum Turing machines, the program evaluations
cannot be surjective in the usual sense, but only in the topologically enriched
sense, i.e., they are dense [6]. We do not know how to derive this model from a
computational monad, albeit relative. Another interesting feature is that most
computational effects induce nonstandard data services, corresponding to com-
plementary bases, which are, of course, used in randomized, quantum, but also
in nondeterministic algorithms [36, 38]. More examples are in [39], but most
work is still ahead.
3.3 Encoding all types
Proposition 3.3. Every type B in a monoidal computer is a retract of the type
of programs P. More precisely, for every type B ∈ |C| there are computations
B P
e
d
such that eB is a map, and eB ; dB = idB . We often call e
B the encoding of B
and dB ∈ C(P, B) is the corresponding decoding.
Remark. Note that there is no claim that either eB or dB is unique. Indeed, in
nondegenerate monoidal computers, each type B has many different encoding
pairs eB, dB. However, once such a pair is chosen, the fact that eB is total
and single-valued means that it assigns a unique program code to each element
of B. The fact that dB is not total means that some programs in P may not
correspond to elements of B.
Since Prop. 3.3 says that the program evaluations make every type into
a retract of P, and Prop. 3.2 reduced the structure of monoidal computer to
the evaluators for all types, it is natural to ask if the evaluators of all types
can be reduced to the evaluators over the type P of programs. Can all of the
structure of a monoidal computer be derived from the structure of the type P
of programs? E.g., can the program evaluations be ”uniformized” by always
encoding the input data of all types in P, performing the evaluations to get the
outputs in P, and then decoding the outputs back to the originally given types?
Can the type structure and the evaluation structure of a monoidal computer
be reconstructed by unfolding the structure of P, as it is the case in models
of λ-calculus? Is monoidal computer yet another categorical view of a partial
applicative structure?
The answer to all these question is positive just in the degenerate case of
an essentially extensional monoidal computer. If the type structure of monoidal
computer can be faithfully encoded in P, then there is a retract of P which
supports an extensional model of computation, i.e. allows assigning a unique
program to each computation.
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If all evaluators can be derived by decoding the evaluators with the output
type P, and if the decoding preserves the original evaluators on P, then all
computation representable in monoidal computer must be provably total and
single valued: it degerates into a cartesian closed category derived from a C-
monoid. For details see [26, I.15-I.17], and the references therein.
Proof. The claimed retraction B P
e
d
can be found using the following di-
agram:
C•(P,P) C(P, B)
idP d
B
eB idB
C•(B,P) C(B,B)
C•(eB ,P)
γIB
P
C(eB ,B)
γIB
B
While dB is defined to be the image of idP along γ
IP
P , e
B is defined to be any
inverse image of idB along γ
IP
B , which must exist because γ
IP
B is a surjection. so
γIPP (idP) = d
B and γIPB (e
B) = idB
The fact that eB ; dB = idB follows from the naturality of γ
IB, which implies
that the square in the diagram commutes, and therefore
eB ; dB = C(eB, B)
(
dB
)
= C(eB, B) ◦ γIPP (idB) =
= γIPB ◦ C
•(eB,P) (idB) = γ
IP
B
(
eB
)
= idB
Remark. In [39] we only considered the basic monoidal computer, where all
types are powers of P. In the standard model, programs are encoded as natural
numbers, and all data are tuples of natural numbers, which can be recursively
encoded as natural numbers. Prop. 3.3 says that this must be the case in every
computer.
3.4 The Fundamental Theorem of Computability
In this section we show that every monoidal computer validates the claim of
Kleene’s fundamental result, which he called the Second Recursion Theorem
[23, 30].
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Theorem 3.4. In every monoidal computer C, for every computation g ∈
C(PA,B) there is a program Γ ∈ C(P) such that
B
A
{}
Γ
=
B
A
Γ
g
P P
g(Γ, a) {Γ} a=
We call Γ Kleene’s fixed program of g.
Proof. Let G be a program such that
B
A
{}
G
=
B
A
g
PP
[ ]
P P
=g
(
[p, p] , a
)
{G}(p, a)
A Kleene fixed program Γ can now be constructed by evaluating G on itself, i.e.
as Γ = [G,G], because
B
A
{}
G
=
B
A
g
G G
B
A
{}=
G
B
A
G
{}=
[ ] [ ]
Γ Γ
= = = =g(Γ, a) g
(
[G,G], a
)
{G}(G, a)
{
[G,G]
}
a {Γ} a
The Fundamental Theorem allows constructing convenient representations
of integers, arithmetic, primitive recursion, and unbounded search, and thus
proving that monoidal computer is Turing complete. In [39], this was done by
using the λ-calculus constructions. In the next section, we provide yet another
proof, by implementing Turing machines.
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4 Coalgebraic view
So far, we formalized the programs −→−→ computations correspondence from the
left hand column of Table 1. But presenting computations in the form XA
{F}
−−→
B only displays their interfaces, and hides the actual process of computation.
To capture that, we switch to the right hand column of Table 1, and study the
correspondence adaptive programs −→− processes.
A process is presented as a morphism in the form X ⊗ A −→ X ⊗ B. We
interpreted the morphisms in the form X ⊗ A −→ B as X-indexed families of
computations with the inputs from A and the outputs in B. The indices of
type X can be thought of as the states of the world, determining which of
the family of computations should be run. Interpreted along the same lines, a
process X ⊗ A
p
−→ X ⊗ B does not only provide the output of type B, but it
also updates the state in X . This is what state machines also do, and that is
why the morphisms X × A
m
−→ X × B in cartesian categories are interpreted
as machines. In a sufficiently complete cartesian category, every such machine
m induces a machine homomorphism X
JmK
−−→ [A+, B], which assigns to each
state x ∈ X a behavior JmKx ∈ [A+, B], unfolded by the final AB-machine
[A+, B] × A
ξ
−→ [A+, B] × B. This was displayed in Table 1. A monoidal com-
puter, though, turns out to provide a much stronger form of representation for
its morphisms in the form X ⊗ A
p
−→ X ⊗ B: each of them induces a machine
homomorphism X
P
−→ P. This P is a program for the process p. Note that there
may be many programs for each process; but on the other hand, all programs, for
all processes of all possible input types A and output types B, are represented
in the same type of programs P. This makes a fundamental difference, distin-
guishing machines m from computational processes p, which include life [31, 52]
3Every family of machines is designed in a suitable engineering language; but all
computational processes can be programmed in any Turing complete language,
just like all processes of life are programmed in the language of genes. That is
why the morphisms X ⊗ A
p
−→ X ⊗ B are processes, and not merely machines.
Their representations X
P
−→ P are not merely X-indexed programs, but they
are adaptive programs, since they adapt to the state changes, in the sense that
we now describe.
Definition 4.1. A morphism XA
p
−→ XB in a monoidal category C is an AB-
process. If Y A
r
−→ Y B is another AB-process, then an AB-process homomor-
phism is a C-morphism X
f
−→ Y such that (f ⊗ A) ; r = p ; (f ⊗B). We denote
by CAB the category of AB-processes.
Definition 4.2. A universal process in a monoidal category C is carried by a
universal state space S ∈ |C|, such that for every pair A,B ∈ |C| there is a
weakly final AB-process SA
{| |}AB
−−−−→ SB. The weak finality means that for every
3Both Turing and von Neumann devoted a lot of attention to studying life as a manifesta-
tion of computational processes. Their ideas have been adopted in biology [2, 28], but most
computer scientists remain skeptical.
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process p ∈ C(XA,XB) there is an X-adaptive program P ∈ C♮(X,S) such
that
{|P (x)|}S a = P (pX(x, a))
{|P (x)|}B a = pB(x, a)
B
{| |}
P
X
S
A
S
=
B
p
X
P
X
A
S
S⊗B
S⊗A X ⊗B
X ⊗A
{| |} P⊗B
pP⊗A
Theorem 4.3. Let C be a symmetric monoidal category with data services.
Then C is a monoidal computer if and only if it has a universal process. The
type P of programs coincides with the universal state space S.
Proof. Given a weakly final AB-process S⊗A
{| |}
−−→ S⊗B, we show that
{}AB =
(
S⊗A
{| |}AB
−−−−→ S⊗B
⊤⊗B
−−−→ B
)
is a universal evaluator, and thus makes C into a monoidal computer. Towards
proving (2), suppose that we are given a computation X⊗A
h
−→ B, and consider
the process
ĥ =
(
X ⊗A
∆⊗A
−−−→ X ⊗X ⊗A
X⊗h
−−−→ X ⊗B
)
By Def. 4.2, there is then an X-adaptive program H ∈ C•(S) satisfying the
rightmost equation in the next diagram.
X A
B
{| |}
H
X A
B
=h
X A
B
h
ĥ
=
X
{}S
S
=
X A
h
ĥ
H
S
B
The middle equation holds because H is in C•, i.e. a comonoid homomorphism.
Deleting the state update from the process yields (2).
The other way around, if C is a monoidal computer, with universal evaluators
for all pairs of types, we claim that the weakly final AB-process is
{| |}
AB
=
(
P⊗A
{}A(PB)
−−−−−→ P⊗B
)
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To prove the claim, take an arbitrary AB-process X ⊗ A
p
−→ X ⊗ B, and post-
compose it with the partial evaluator on X , to get
p̂ =
(
P⊗X ⊗A
P⊗p
−−−→ P⊗X ⊗B
[ ]XBP⊗B
−−−−−−→ P⊗B
)
Using the Fundamental Theorem of Computability, Thm. 3.4, construct a Kleene’s
fixed point P̂ ∈ C(P) of p̂.
B
A
{}
P̂
=
B
A
p
P̂
PP
X X
X
p̂[ ]
TheX-adaptive programP ∈ C•(P) corresponding to the process p ∈ C(XA,XB)
is now P (x) =
[
P̂ , x
]XBP
.
B
A
{}=
B
A
p
P̂
PP
X X
[ ]
P
P̂
[ ]
P
This completes the proof that {}A(BP) satisfies definition 4.2 of weakly final AB-
process, and that P is thus not only a type of programs, but also a universal
state space.
5 Computability
In the remaining two sections we show how to run Turing machines in a monoidal
computer, and how to measure their complexity. But a coalgebraic treatment of
Turing machines as machines, in the sense discussed at the beginning of Sec. 4,
would only display their behaviors, i.e. what rewrite and which move of the
machine head will happen on which input, and it obliterates the configurations
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of the tape, where the actual computation happens. In terms of Sec. 4, a Turing
machine as a model of actual computation should not be viewed as a machine,
but as a process. So we call them Turing processes here. While changing well
established terminology is seldom a good idea, and we may very well regret
this decision, the hope is that it will be a useful reminder that we are doing
something unusual: relating Turing machines with adaptive programs, coalge-
braically. The presented constructions go through in an arbitrary monoidal
computer, but require spelling out a suitable representation of the integers, and
some arithmetic. This was done in [39], and can be done more directly; but
for the sake of brevity, we work here with the category C of recursively enu-
merable sets and computable partial functions from Sec. 3.2. The monoidal
structure and the data services are induced by the cartesian products of sets,
which are, of course not categorical products in a category of partial functions4.
The monoidal category (C,⊗, I) will henceforth thus be (C,⊗,1).
Recall that Turing’s definition of his machines can be recast [43, Appendix]
to processes in the form
Qρ ⊗ Σ
ρ
⇀ Qρ ⊗ Σ⊗Θ
where
• Qρ is the finite set of states, always including the final state X ∈ Qρ;
• Σ is a fixed alphabet, the same for all ρ, always including the blank symbol
⊔ ∈ Σ;
• Θ = {⊳,, ⊲} are the directions in which the head can move along the
tape.
Let us recall the execution model: how these machines and processes com-
pute. A Mealy machine Qκ × I
κ
⇀ Qκ × O inputs a string n
ι
−→ I, where
n = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} sequentially, e.g. it reads the inputs ι0, then ι1 etc, and
it outputs a string n
ω
−→ O in the same order, i.e. ω0, ω1, etc. In contrast,
a Turing process in principle overwrites its inputs, and outputs the results of
overwriting when it halts; therefore, in a Turing process, the input alphabet I
and its output alphabet O must be the same, say I = O = Σ. Both the inputs,
and the outputs, and the intermediary data of a Turing process are in the form
w : Z −→ Σ, where all but finitely many values w(z) must be ⊔. So each word
w : Z −→ Σ is still a finite string of symbols, like in the Mealy machine model.
The difference is that w is written on the infinite ’tape’, here represented by the
set of integers Z, which allows the processing ’head’ to move in both directions,
or to stay stationary (while in a Mealy machine the head moves in the same
direction at each step). We represent the position of the head by the integer 0,
and the symbol that the head reads on that position is thus denoted by w(0). If
the process Qρ⊗Σ
ρ
⇀ Qρ⊗Σ⊗Θ, which is a triple of functions ρ = 〈ρQ, ρΣ, ρΘ〉,
is defined on a given state q ∈ Qρ and a given input σ = w(0), then it will
4The reason is that the singleton set, which is still the tensor unit, is not a terminal object
for partial functions.
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• overwrite σ with σ′ = ρΣ(q, σ),
• transition to the state q′ = ρQ(q, σ), and
• move the head to the next cell in the direction θ = ρΘ(q, σ).
If q = X, then ρ(X, σ) = 〈X, σ,〉, which means that the process must halt at
the state X, if it ever reaches it.
To capture this execution model formally, we extend Turing processes over
the alphabet Σ, first to processes over the set Σ˜ of Σ-words written on a tape,
and then to computations with the inputs and the outputs from Σ˜
Qρ ⊗ Σ
ρ
⇀ Qρ ⊗ Σ⊗Θ
Qρ ⊗ Σ˜
ρ˜
⇀ Qρ ⊗ Σ˜
Qρ ⊗ Σ˜
ρ
⇀ Σ˜
where
Σ˜ =
{
w : Z −→ Σ | supp(w) <∞
}
is the set of Σ-words written on a tape, and supp(w) = {z | w(z) 6= ⊔} . The
elements of Σ˜ are often also called the tape configurations. Writing the tuples
in the form ρ˜ = 〈ρ˜Q, ρ˜Σ˜〉, define
ρ˜Q(q, w) = ρQ(q, w(0))
ρ˜Σ˜(q, w) = w
′ where w′(z) =

w˜(z − 1) if ρΘ (q, w(0)) = ⊳
w˜(z) if ρΘ (q, w(0)) = 
w˜(z + 1) if ρΘ (q, w(0)) = ⊲
 and
w˜(z) =
{
ρΣ (q, w(0)) if z = 0
w(z) otherwise
}
ρ(q, w) =
{
w if q = X
ρ
(
ρ˜(q, w)
)
otherwise
The execution of all Turing processes can now be captured as a single process
Q⊗ Σ˜
p
⇀ Q⊗ Σ˜
where the state space Q is the disjoint union of the state spaces Qρ of all Turing
processes ρ ∈ T , i.e.
Q =
∐
ρ∈T
Qρ where T = {Qρ ⊗ Σ
ρ
⇀ Qρ ⊗ Σ⊗Θ}
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so that the elements of Q are the pairs 〈ρ, q〉, where q ∈ Qρ, and Q⊗ Σ˜
p
⇀ Q⊗ Σ˜
is the pair p = 〈pQ, pΣ˜〉 which, when applied to 〈ρ, q〉 ∈ Q and w ∈ Σ˜, gives:
p
(
〈ρ, q〉, w
)
=
〈
〈ρ, q′〉, w′
〉
where q′ = ρ˜Q(q, w) and w
′ = ρ˜Σ˜(q, w)
By applying Thm. 4.3 to the process Q⊗ Σ˜
p
⇀ Q⊗ Σ˜, we get the following
Proposition 5.1. There is an adaptive program P˜ ∈ C•(Q,P) such that P˜ (ρ, q)
executes any Turing process ρ starting from the initial state q ∈ Qρ. This means
that for every tape configuration w ∈ Σ˜ holds{
|P˜ (ρ, q)|
}
P
w = P˜ (ρ, q′){
|P˜ (ρ, q)|
}
Σ˜
w = w′
where q′ = ρQ
(
q, w(0)
)
is the next state of ρ, and w′ = ρ˜Σ˜
(
q, w
)
is the next tape
configuration. (The string diagram is the same as the one in Def. 4.2.)
Corollary 5.2. The monoidal computer C is Turing complete.
6 Complexity
6.1 Evaluating Turing processes
Using the process Q⊗Σ˜
p
⇀ Q⊗Σ˜, which according to Prop. 5.1 executes the single
step transitions of Turing processes, we would now like to define a computation
Q⊗ Σ˜
p
⇀ Σ˜ that will evaluate Turing processes all the way; i.e. should execute
all transitions that a process executes, and halt and deliver the output if the
process halts, or diverge if the process diverges. The idea is to run something
like the following pseudocode
p
(
〈ρ, q〉, w
)
=
(
x := 〈ρ, q〉; y := w; (3)
while
(
pQ(x, y) 6= X
){
x := pQ(x, y); y := pΣ˜(x, y)
}
;
print y
)
We implement this program using the Fundamental Theorem of Computabil-
ity. The function p is derived as a Kleene’s fixed program for an intermediary
function p˜, lifting the derivation from Sec. 5.
Q⊗ Σ˜
p
⇀ Q⊗ Σ˜
P⊗ Q⊗ Σ˜
p˜
⇀ Σ˜
Q⊗ Σ˜
p
⇀ Σ˜
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The definition of p˜ lifts the definition of ρ˜ from Sec. 5, extended by an undeter-
mined program Υ
p˜
(
Υ, 〈ρ, q〉, w
)
=

w if ρQ (q, w(0)) = X
{Υ}
(
〈ρ, q′〉, w′
)
otherwise
where q′ = ρQ
(
q, w(0)
)
and w′ = pΣ˜
(
〈ρ, q〉, w
)
Using the if-branching from Sec. 3.1, this schema can be expressed in a monoidal
computer, as illustrated in the diagram below. Set Υ to be Kleene’s fixed
program P˜ of p˜, and define p = {P˜}. This construction boils down to the first
one of the following string diagram equations:
{}¬X?
if = {}
p
P
Q Σ˜
Σ˜
Σ˜Q
P Σ˜
Σ˜
P˜
p˜
=
Σ˜
{}
P
Σ˜Q
P˜ p
=
Σ˜
{}
Σ˜Q
P˜
[ ]
P
Given 〈ρ, q〉 ∈ Q and w ∈ Σ˜, p thus runs ρ on w, starting from q and halting at
X, at which point it outputs the current w. If it does not reach X, then ρ runs
forever. The second equation in the above diagram proves the next proposition.
Proposition 6.1. There is an adaptive program P ∈ C•(Q,P) that evaluates
any Turing process ρ starting from a given initial state q ∈ Qρ. This means that
for every tape configuration w ∈ Σ˜ holds{
P (ρ, q)
}
w = ρ(q, w)
6.2 Counting time
To count the steps in the executions of Turing processes, we add a counter
i ∈ N to the Turing process evaluator p. The counter gets increased by at each
execution step, and thus counts them. We call t the computation which outputs
the final count. If p halts, then t outputs the value of the counter i; if p does not
halt, then t diverges as well. The pseudocode for t could thus look something
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like this:
t
(
〈ρ, q〉, w
)
=
(
x := 〈ρ, q〉; y := w; i := 0; (4)
while
(
pQ(x, y) 6= X
){
x := pQ(x, y); y := pΣ˜(x, y); i := i+ 1
}
;
print i
)
The implementation of t in a monoidal computer is similar to the implementa-
tion of p. It follows a similar derivation pattern:
Q⊗ Σ˜
p
⇀ Q⊗ Σ˜
P⊗ Q⊗ Σ˜⊗ N
t˜
⇀ N
Q⊗ Σ˜
t
⇀ N
where
t˜
(
Υ, 〈ρ, q〉, w, i
)
=
{
i if ρQ (q, w(0)) = X
{Υ}
(
〈ρ, q′〉, w′, i+ 1
)
otherwise
t
(
〈ρ, q〉, w
)
=
{
T˜
}(
〈ρ, q〉, w, 0
)
where
q′ = ρQ
(
q, w(0)
)
w′ = pΣ˜
(
〈ρ, q〉, w
)
and T˜ is Kleene’s fixed program of t˜. It is easy to see, and prove, that
t
(
〈ρ, q〉, w
)
halts if and only if ρ(q, w) halts, and if it does halt, then it outputs
the number of steps that ρ made before halting, having started from q and w.
The string diagrams that implmenet t˜, T˜ , t and T are obtained from the string
diagrams in the previous section by renaming ps to ts and P s to T s, and by
adding string of type N to the right, with one operation on it, increasing the
counter. This string, of course, outputs the time complexity p. Hence
Proposition 6.2. There is an adaptive program T ∈ C•(Q,P) that outputs the
number of steps that a Turing process ρ makes in any run from a given initial
state q ∈ Qρ to the halting state X. If the Turing process ρ starting from q
diverges, then the computation {T (ρ, q)} diverges as well. This means that, for
every tape configuration w ∈ Σ˜ holds{
T (ρ, q)
}
w = t
(
〈ρ, q〉, w
)
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6.3 Counting space
So far, we used the integers Z as the index set for the tape configurations
w : Z −→ Σ. The position of the head has always been 0 ∈ Z, and whenever
the head moves, the tape configuration w gets updated to w′ = ρ˜Σ˜(q, w), where
w′(0) is the new position of the head, and the rest of the word w is reindexed
accordingly, as described in Sec. 5. At each point of the computation w thus
describes the tape content relative to the current position of the head ; there is
no record of the prior positions or contents.
To count the tape cells used by Turing processes, we must make the tape
itself into a first class citizen. The simplest way to do this seems to be to add
a counter m ∈ Z, which denotes the offset of the current position of the head
with respect to the initial position. This allows us to record how far up and
down the tape, how far from its original position, does the head ever travel in
either direction during the computation. To record these maximal offsets of the
head, we need two more counters: let r ∈ Z be the highest value that the head
offsetm ever takes; and let ℓ ∈ Z be the lowest value that the head offsetm ever
takes. The number of cells that the head has visited during the computation
is then clearly r − ℓ. To implement this space counting idea, we need to run a
program roughly like this:
s
(
〈ρ, q〉, w
)
=
(
x := 〈ρ, q〉; y := w; ℓ,m, r := 0; (5)
while
(
pQ(x, y) 6= X
){
x := pQ(x, y); y := pΣ˜(x, y);
if
(
ρΘ
(
q, w(0)
)
= ⊳
){
if (m = ℓ){ℓ := ℓ− 1}; m := m− 1
}
if
(
ρΘ
(
q, w(0)
)
= ⊲
)
{
if (m = r){r := r + 1}; m := m+ 1
}}
print r − ℓ
)
The derivation now becomes
Q⊗ Σ˜
p
⇀ Q⊗ Σ˜
P⊗ Q⊗ Σ˜⊗ Z3
s˜
⇀ N
Q⊗ Σ˜
s
⇀ N
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where
s˜
(
Υ, 〈ρ, q〉, w, ℓ,m, r
)
=
{
r − ℓ if ρQ (q, w(0)) = X
{Υ}
(
〈ρ, q′〉, w′, ℓ′, m′, r′
)
otherwise
}
s
(
〈ρ, q〉, w
)
=
{
S˜
}(
〈ρ, q〉, w, 0, 0, 0
)
where
q′ = ρQ
(
q, w(0)
)
w′ = pΣ˜
(
〈ρ, q〉, w
)
ℓ′ =
{
ℓ− 1 if m = ℓ and ρΘ
(
q, w(0)
)
= ⊳
ℓ otherwise
m′ =

m− 1 if ρΘ
(
q, w(0)
)
= ⊳
m if ρΘ
(
q, w(0)
)
= 
m+ 1 if ρΘ
(
q, w(0)
)
= ⊲
r′ =
{
r + 1 if m = r and ρΘ
(
q, w(0)
)
= ⊲
r otherwise
and S˜ is Kleene’s fixed program of s˜. In a monoidal computer, the above
constructions correspond to the following diagrams
{}¬X?
if = {}
p
P
Q
N
Q
P
N
S˜
s˜
=
N
{}
P
Q
S˜
s
=
N
{}
Q
S˜
[ ]
S0
Σ˜
Σ˜
Σ˜ Σ˜
0
−
()′
Z3 Z3
Z3
ℓ
′
r
′
m
′
ℓ r
r−ℓ
The box ()′, which computes ℓ′, m′ and r′ as above, is implemented by compos-
ing several branching commands, e.g. as described at the end of Sec. 3.1. Imple-
menting this box is an easy but instructive exercise in programming monoidal
computers. Put together, these constructions prove the following proposition.
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Proposition 6.3. There is an adaptive program S ∈ C•(Q,P) that outputs the
number of cells that a Turing process ρ uses in any run from a given initial state
q ∈ Qρ to the halting state X. If the Turing process ρ starting from q diverges,
then the computation {S(ρ, q)} diverges as well. This means that, for every tape
configuration w ∈ Σ˜ holds{
S(ρ, q)
}
w = s
(
〈ρ, q〉, w
)
Remark. There are many variations of the above definitions in the literature,
and several different counting conventions. E.g., an alternative to the above
definition of s would be something like
s′
(
〈ρ, q〉, w
)
=
{
S˜
}(
〈ρ, q〉, w, wℓ, 0, wr
)
where
wℓ = min{i ∈ Z | w(i) 6= ⊔}
wr = max{i ∈ Z | w(i) 6= ⊔}
In contrast with s, where the space counting convention is that a memory cell
counts as used if and only if it is ever reached by the head, the space counting
convention behind s′ is that every computation uses at least |w| = wr − wℓ
cells, on which its initial input is written. If a Turing process halts without
reading all of its input w, or even without reading any of it, the space used will
still be |w|. Some textbooks adhere to the s-counting convention, some to the
s′-counting convention, but many do not describe the process in enough detail
to discern this difference. This is perhaps justified by the fact that the resulting
complexity classes and their hierarchies are the same for all such subtly different
counting conventions. E.g., the difference between s and s′ is absorbed by the
O-notation, and only arises for computations that do not read their inputs.
7 Final comments
A bird’s eye view of algebra and coalgebra in computer science suggests that
algebra provides denotational semantics of computation, whereas coalgebra pro-
vides operational semantics [25, 43, 50]. Denotational semantics goes beyond
the purely extensional view of computations (as maps from inputs to outputs),
and models certain computational effects (such as non-termination, exceptions,
non-determinism, etc.). Operational semantics goes further, and models com-
putational operations. While computational effects are thus presented using the
suitable algebraic operations in denotational semantics, computational behav-
iors are represented as elements of final coalgebras in operational semantics.
But although both the denotational and the operational approaches go be-
yond the purely extensional view, neither has supported a genuinely intensional
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view, envisioned by Turing and von Neumann, where programs are data. There-
fore, in spite of the tremendous successes in understanding and systematizing
computational structures and behaviors, categorical semantics of computation
has remained largely disjoint from theories of computability and complexity.
The claim put forward in this paper is that coalgebra provides a natural
categorical framework for a fully intensional categorical theory of computability
and complexity. The crucial step that enables this theory leads beyond final
coalgebras, that assign unique descriptions to computational behaviors of fixed
types, to universal coalgebras, that assign non-unique descriptions to computa-
tions of arbitrary types. These descriptions are what we usually call programs.
Our message is thus that programmability is a coalgebraic property, just like
computational behaviors are coalgebraic. This message is formally expressed
through universal processes ; it can perhaps be expressed more generally through
universal coalgebras, as families of weakly final coalgebras, all carried by the
same universal state space. Thm. 4.3 spells out in the framework of monoidal
computer the fact that every Turing complete programming language provides
a universal coalgebra for computable functions of all types; and vice versa, ev-
ery universal coalgebra induces a corresponding notion of program. Just like
abstract computational behaviors of a given type are precisely the elements of
a final coalgebra of that type, abstract programs are precisely the elements of
a universal coalgebra. Just like final coalgebras can be used to define seman-
tics of computational behaviors [43], universal coalgebras can be used to define
semantics of programs.
From a slightly different angle, the fact that universal coalgebras character-
ize monoidal computers, proven in Thm. 4.3, can also be viewed as a coalgebraic
characterization of computability. There are, of course, many characterizations
of computability. The upshot of this one is, however, in Propositions 6.2 and 6.3:
the coalgebaic view of computability opens an alley towards complexity. In any
universe of computable functions, normal complexity measures [41] can be pro-
grammed coalgebraically. Combining this coalgebraic view of complexity with
the algebraic view of randomized computation seems to open up a path towards
a categorical model of one-way functions, and towards categorical cryptography,
which has been the original goal of this project [37].
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Appendix
Proposition. Let C be a distributive category, and consider the following struc-
tures, characterized by the couniversal properties in Table 1:
a) exponents [A,B],
b) final machines [A+, B].
Then
• (a) induces (b) if C has initial algebras for FA(X) = A + (A×X) for all
A;
• (b) induces (a) if C has absolute limits, i.e. the idempotents split in it.
A distributive category with list constructors and split idempotents is thus carte-
sian closed if and only if it has final machines.
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Proof. Towards the proof of (a) =⇒ (b), suppose that C is a cartesian closed
category with the exponents written [A,B], and with an initial FA-algebra
A+
(
A×A+
) [ι,::]
−−→ A+
The intuition is that A+ is the type of nonempty lists of elements of A, i.e. the
free semigroup generated by A. The initial FA-algebra structure consists of the
inclusion A
ι
→֒ A+, and the operation A × A+
::
−→ which can be thought of as
prepending a symbol a ∈ A to the list α ∈ A+, to construct the list a :: α.
The final machine with the inputs from A and the outputs in B is in the
form [
A+, B
]
×A
〈ξ0,ξ1〉
−−−−→
[
A+, B
]
×B (6)
where ξ0 is derived from prepending (::) and the closed structure by[
A+, B
]
×A×A+
[A+,B]×(::)
−−−−−−−−→
[
A+, B
]
×A+
ε
−−→ B[
A+, B
]
×A
ξ0
−→
[
A+, B
]
whereas ξ1 is just the evaluation restricted along ι[
A+, B
]
×A
[ι,B]×A
−−−−−→ [A,B]×A
ε
−−→ B[
A+, B
]
×A
ξ1
−→ B
To show that (6) is a final machine, note first that every machine X×A
〈x0,x1〉
−−−−→
X × B induces an FA-algebra over [X,B] by transposing
X ×
(
A+
(
A× [X,B]
)) κ˜
−→ B
A+
(
A× [X,B]
) κ
−→ [X,B]
where κ˜ is the composite
X×
(
A+
(
A× [X,B]
))
∼=
(
X×A
)
+
(
X×A× [X,B]
) (X×A)+(x0×[X,B])
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
−→
(
X ×A
)
+
(
X × [X,B]
)
∼=
(
X ×A
)
+
(
[X,B]×B
)
[x1,ε]
−−−→ B
The FA-algebra κ now induces the catamorphism LκM, which induces the anamor-
phism JxK
A+
(
A×A+
)
A+ X ×A X ×B
A+
(
A× [X,B]
)
[X,B] [A+, B]×A [A+, B]×B
[ι,::]
A+(A×LκM) LκM
x
JxK×A JxK×B
κ ξ
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by the tranposition
A+
LκM
−−→ [X,B]
X
JxK
−−→
[
A+, B
]
The diagram chase showing that the commutativity and uniqueness of the cata-
morphism on the left induces the commutativity and uniqueness of the anamor-
phism on the right is lengthy but straightforward.
Towards the proof of (b) =⇒ (a), the assumption is that C has final machines[
A+, B
]
×A
〈ξ0,ξ1〉
−−−−→
[
A+, B
]
×B
so that the machine [A+, B]×A
〈π0,ξ1〉
−−−−→ [A+, B]×B induces the anamorphism
Jπ0, ξ1K, as displayed on the following diagram.
[A+, B]×A [A+, B]×B
[A,B]×A [A,B]×B
[A+, B]×A [A+, B]×B
〈π0,ξ1〉
Jπ0,ξ1K×A
q×A q×B
Jπ0,ξ1K×B
〈π0,ε〉
m×A m×B
〈ξ0,ξ1〉
Since it is easy to see that Jπ0, ξ1K is an endomorphism on the machine [A
+, B]×
A
〈π0,ξ1〉
−−−−→ [A+, B]×B, the uniqueness of Jπ0, ξ1K as an anamorphism implies
Jπ0, ξ1K ◦ Jπ0, ξ1K = Jπ0, ξ1K
Using the assumption that the idempotents in C split, we now define the ex-
ponent [A,B] as the splitting [A+, B]
q
։ [A,B]
m
֌ [A+, B] of Jπ0, ξ1K. The
morphism [A,B]× A
ε
−−→ B, induced by the splitting in the above diagram, is
the counit of the adjunction (−)×A ⊣ [A,−], for the transposition operation λ
from Table 1 defined
C(X ×A,B)
λ
−−→ C(X, [A,B])
f 7−→ λf = q ◦ Jπ0, fK
To show that ε ◦ (λf ×A) = f holds, chase the following diagram:
X ×A X ×B
[A+, B]×A [A+, B]×B
[A,B]×A [A,B]×B
〈π0,f〉
Jπ0,fK×A
λf×A
Jπ0,fK×B
λf×B
〈π0,ξ1〉
q×A q×B
〈π0,ε〉
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